A (business) protocol describes, in high-level terms, a pattern of communication between two or more participants, specifically via the creation and manipulation of the commitments between them. In this manner, a protocol offers both flexibility and rigor: a participant may communicate in any way it chooses as long as it discharges all of its activated commitments. Protocols thus promise benefits in engineering cross-organizational business processes. However, software engineering using protocols presupposes a formalization of protocols and a notion of the refinement of one protocol by another. Refinement for protocols is both intuitively obvious (e.g., PayViaCheck is clearly a kind of Pay) and technically nontrivial (e.g., compared to Pay, PayViaCheck involves different participants exchanging different messages). This article formalizes protocols and their refinement. It develops Proton, an analysis tool for protocol specifications that overlays a model checker to compute whether one protocol refines another with respect to a stated mapping. Proton and its underlying theory are evaluated by formalizing several protocols from the literature and verifying all and only the expected refinements.
INTRODUCTION
We focus our attention on business service engagements as realized over the Internet. In current practice, such an engagement is defined rigidly and purely in operational terms. Consequently, the software components of the business partners involved are tightly coupled with each other, and depend closely on the engagement specification. Even small changes in one partner's components must be propagated to others, even when such changes are inconsequential to the business being conducted. Conversely, if the model leaves the engagements unstructured, humans must carry out the necessary interactions manually, with concomitant loss in productivity. We motivate protocols as providing a happy middle ground between rigid automation and flexible manual execution.
Specifically, in contrast with traditional approaches, we model each partner as an autonomous agent. The agents participate in a (business) protocol to realize a service engagement. A protocol describes a pattern of communication between agents. Based on the foregoing, we formulate the following key requirements on a suitable formalization of protocols. First, a protocol is public, meaning that it pertains to the messages sent and received by participating agents, not how these agents are implemented. Thus, the semantics of a protocol should depend solely on the communications of the agents enacting it, not on their internal policies. Second, the semantics should capture the business meanings of the messages, thereby avoiding operational constraints, and thus enabling the agents to deal better with exceptions and opportunities [Yolum and Singh 2002] . Third, the semantics should be modular: an agent who enacts a protocol correctly may concurrently enact additional protocols. Fourth, designing engagements using protocols presupposes that we support engineering methodologies such as those based on stepwise refinement. We address the preceding criteria for protocols with an emphasis on their refinement.
We understand a protocol semantically in terms of exactly the set of runs (i.e., computations) that it allows. Following Mallya and Singh [2007] , we posit that a putative subprotocol refines a putative superprotocol if and only if each run allowed by the subprotocol is also allowed by the superprotocol. In general, a subprotocol would include additional roles and actions: in determining refinement, we disregard those that do not feature in the superprotocol. Doing so facilitates modularity, enhanceability, and reuse of protocols.
Consider a simple protocol Pay consisting of two actions where a payer first commits to paying a payee, and next pays. Now consider a protocol PayViaMM where the payer first pays a middleman, who in turn pays the payee. Both Pay and PayViaMM send a payment from the payer to the payee. Even though PayViaMM involves an additional role (middleman) and PayViaMM uses different messages (two payment messages instead of one), we expect PayViaMM refines Pay, because PayViaMM makes a payment as Pay specifies. Similarly, we expect PayViaCheck and PayViaCredit also refine Pay. We imagine a service engagement design exercise where protocol designers begin by identifying the need for payment as Pay, then refine it to PayViaMM , and then to PayViaCheck . The designers may build or find an existing repository of protocols (analogous to taxonomies of business processes [Malone et al. 2003] ). The question we address is how can protocols in such a repository be expressed so that their refinements can be rigorously verified.
Proton: Approach and Contributions
We formulate refinement in technical terms and show how to compute it via a tool called Proton. We specify a protocol declaratively in terms of: (i) its roles, (ii) the guarded messages the roles exchange, and (iii) the meaning of each message as a set of actions on the public state of the roles, sometimes termed the social state [Baldoni et al. 2010] . Commitments between roles are central to our approach [Singh 1999 ]. Section 2.4 provides additional details. For now, suffice it to say that a state of a protocol is determined by what atomic propositions hold therein (some propositions specify the states of commitments).
We define the semantics of a protocol precisely in terms of the runs (i.e., sequences of actions) it allows. Informally, a subprotocol refines a superprotocol if and only if the latter allows all the runs the former allows. However, refinement is nontrivial because the protocols may involve different roles and messages, the messages may have different meanings, and the meanings may be at different levels of abstraction. Hence, we define refinement only with respect to a mapping of meanings from the superprotocol to the subprotocol. For example, the payment in Pay maps to two payments in PayViaMM .
Our approach for verifying refinement takes three inputs: formal descriptions of a putative superprotocol and subprotocol, and a mapping between them. We reduce the protocol descriptions to their canonical forms, taking into account the mapping provided. We generate an input to an existing model checker consisting of: (i) a specification of a temporal logic model and (ii) temporal formulae whose truth in the model verifies refinement.
Contributions
Our main contributions are as follows. One, we offer the first approach that computes the refinement for protocols based on static analysis of protocol specifications. Two, we formulate a notion of the serial composition of commitments, which can have broader applications than this article, for example in the treatment of commitments in coalitions. Further, we have implemented our approach in the Proton tool that overlays the wellknown model checker MCMAS (http://www-lai.doc.ic.ac.uk/mcmas/). Figure 1 summarizes some protocol refinements that Proton verifies (under the obvious mappings) based on the preceding and other examples known from the literature.
Organization
Section 2 overviews our syntax and semantics and briefly reviews commitments. Section 3 introduces our running examples for payment and order protocols. Section 4 formalizes our definitions of protocols, mappings between protocols, and protocol refinement. Section 5 describes how Proton generates input for the MCMAS model checker and the CTL formulae that must be satisfied for protocol refinement to hold. Section 6 pulls the previous sections together, illustrating how protocol PayViaMM refines, or fails to refine, protocol Pay under various mappings. Section 7 shows that the algorithmic implementation in Section 5 is correct with respect to the theoretical framework of Section 4. Section 8 describes the related literature and important future directions.
TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK
We adopt the following terminology. A subprotocol refines a superprotocol. In hyphenated form, super-x and sub-x refer to element x as it occurs in the superprotocol and subprotocol, respectively. For example, a super-role is a role defined in the superprotocol and a sub-commitment is a commitment defined in the subprotocol.
Interpreted Systems
We adopt Lomuscio and Raimondi's [2006] and Cohen et al.'s [2009] formalization of a multiagent system as an interpreted system. Importantly, protocols involve roles, not agents. We presume no knowledge of the internals of an agent playing a role and consider all possible strategies that a role may follow in a protocol.
Each role is described by a set of possible local states, a set of local actions, a local strategy listing the legal actions in each local state, and a local progression function defining the progression of the role's local state based on the actions performed by all the roles. To clarify the terminology, our role and strategy, respectively, map to agent and protocol in work by Lomuscio and colleagues. Definition 2.1 (Interpreted System). An interpreted system I is 
is the set of reachable global states. For any global state g ∈ G, we write g i for the i-th component in g, that is, the local state of role i in g. G 0 ⊆ G is a nonempty set of initial global states. PV : P → 2 G is the evaluation function for propositions. The set of joint actions is Act = Act
is the local progression function for role i ∈ \ e, and t e : L e × Act → L e is the progression function for the environment. All roles progress simultaneously. The global progression function is T : G × Act → G and is defined such that
and t e (g e , a e ) = g e . T must be serial (∀g ∈ G, ∃a ∈ Act, ∃g ∈ G : T (g, a) = g ). F is a set of Boolean fairness conditions, each of which must be true infinitely often on all legal execution paths. A path π in I is an infinite sequence of global states g 0 , g 1 , . . . in G such that every pair of adjacent states is a legal transition, that is, ∀i ≥ 0 : ∃a ∈ Act : T (g i , a) = g i+1 . The i-th state in path π is denoted π i , and the set of all paths starting at g ∈ G is denoted (g).
Given an interpreted system I, we associate with it a Kripke model K = (G, G 0 , T , PV ) where G is the set of possible worlds understood as the reachable states of K, built from the set of initial states G 0 by iterating the global progression function T ; and the temporal relation T ⊆ G × Act × G connects global states based on the joint actions. The labeling function PV is the propositional labeling function.
The grammar of the temporal language CTL is (PropName is an atomic proposition) 
The Protocol nonterminal describes the syntax for a protocol (as Listing 1 exemplifies). A protocol declares roles, propositions, commitments, and messages. Each message m is sent from a sender (m.snd ) to a receiver (m.rcv), has a guard (m.guard ) which must be true before the message can be sent, a set of actions (m.actions) that means a conjunction of these actions (m.actexp). Actions are either propositions (being set true) or a commitment operation (being performed). Boolean negation (¬) is allowed in antecedent, consequent, and guard expressions to check state, but a message meaning cannot set a proposition to false using a negated action.
The Map nonterminal describes the syntax for a mapping between two protocols (as Listing 3 exemplifies). A mapping maps individual roles, propositions, and commitments from the putative superprotocol to expressions in the putative subprotocol. ProtoName, MapName, RoleName, PropName, ComName, MsgName, and Action are names.
The serial composition operator, ⊕, chains two commitments together and is described in Section 2.5. We write i C i for a left-associated chain (C 1 ⊕ C 2 ) ⊕ · · · ⊕ C n . In Section 2.6, we compare commitments between superprotocol and subprotocol, under an abstraction mapping M, using commitment covering (≤ M ).
Proton Semantics
Proton's semantics is based on interpreted systems: it constructs an interpreted system from an input superprotocol, subprotocol, and mapping.
Each state g is a set of true propositions p i . All propositions are false in the initial state g 0 . Actions cause state transitions. For this article, we use a simplified model of actions, assuming actions: (i) always succeed, (ii) have definite outcomes (no uncertainty), and (iii) have no side-effects. The actions for role i, Act i , are the propositional and commitment actions Act
where A is the set of protocol propositions, C is the set of protocol commitments, Act C = {CREATE, TRANSFER, RELEASE, CANCEL}, and nop represents no-operation. Operationally, messaging is point-to-point and synchronous. All protocol state is stored in the "environment" (effectively, a distinguished agent), and is globally accessible by all roles (a current simplification). At each time step, the environment schedules one role to execute next (interleaved execution). When scheduled, the role's agent: (i) determines which of its messages are currently enabled, by accessing the protocol's global state and evaluating each message's guard expression, (ii) chooses an enabled message to send or chooses "no-operation", (iii) performs all actions in the message's meaning, in any order, and (iv) updates the protocol's state.
In every global state g of the interpreted system, each commitment C i has a state, C i .status ∈ Status C , where Status C = {null , cond , detached , dis, xfer, rel , can}, whose value can be any of the states in Figure 3 . We define propositions for the expressions C.status = x in each state g. For each commitment C i , we evaluate the occurrence of the commitment operations using the following four propositions.
= C i .status = can As Section 1.1 mentions and Definition 4.6 formalizes, refinement depends upon a mapping between protocols to account for their different levels of abstraction. Specifically, we must map each: (i) super-role to a set of subroles, (ii) superproposition to a Boolean expression of subpropositions, and (iii) supercommitment to an expression of subcommitments. Proton combines two protocols and a mapping to: (i) construct an interpreted system model I from the subprotocol's propositions, commitments, and guarded actions, as specified in Definition 4.2 and (ii) generate appropriate CTL formulae as specified in Section 5.6. The refinement in consideration holds if and only if the constructed model satisfies all the CTL formulae that Proton generates.
Background on Commitments
Commitments are a formal and concise method of describing how agent roles commit to performing future actions [Singh 1999; Yolum and Singh 2002] . We extend previous commitment definitions in two ways. First, we allow both debtors and creditors to be sets of roles, enabling us to handle commitment chains with multiple debtors and multiple creditors. Second, we introduce a new TRANSFER commitment operation to unify and replace prior uses of DELEGATE and ASSIGN. A commitment C {debtors},{creditors} (antecedent, consequent) means that the debtors commit to the creditors, that if the antecedent holds, they will bring about the consequent. In an active commitment whose antecedent is false, the debtors are conditionally committed to the creditors. When the antecedent becomes true, we say the commitment is detached, and the debtors become unconditionally committed to the creditors.
Consider the following two example commitments drawn from the payment scenarios: (i) C Payer,Payee (promise, pay): the payer conditionally commits to paying the payee; and (ii) C {Payer,MM},Payee (promise, pay P ∧ pay M ): the payer and middleman commit to paying the payee via pay P (the payer's payment) and pay M (the middleman's payment). Figure 3 shows the state transition diagram for a commitment. We understand a protocol Q as refining a protocol P if and only if the correct enactments of Q are also correct enactments of P. As in previous work, in a correct enactment of a protocol each detached commitment must eventually resolve. Debtors may act before they are required to do so and the consequent may become true before the antecedent. In general, there is no guarantee that autonomous debtors do not arbitrarily CANCEL. In practice, the creditors would assume the debtors are trustworthy or the setting would include an external mechanism (such as penalties) to ensure the debtors' compliance.
Serial Composition of Commitments
In PayViaMM , where the payer commits to a middleman who commits to the payee, the two commitments together effectively commit the payer to the payee. We introduce serial composition as a general way to chain commitments over intermediaries, computing a single, resultant commitment. The serial composition of commitments is a static construct, but the resultant commitment dynamically progresses through the states in Figure 3 as the protocol progresses.
Definition 2.2. Let C A and C B be two commitments where C A .csq |= C B .ant. Then, the serial composition of C A and C B is the commitment C ⊕ = C A ⊕C B whose components are specified precisely as follows:
The state of C ⊕ is defined based on the states of C A and C B . C ⊕ is created exactly when both C A and C B are created. C ⊕ is respectively transferred, released, or canceled when at least one of C A and C B is transferred, released, or canceled.
Singh 's [2008] formalization of commitments includes the similar idea of commitment chaining, but serial composition additionally captures the intuition of a coalition of roles. The aforesaid well-definedness condition C A .csq |= C B .ant follows Singh's [2008] definition for chaining, although serial composition accommodates different roles. The second commitment becomes active (C B .ant) whenever the first commitment resolves (C A .csq), including the case where the first debtors perform without being required to do so (C A .ant always false).
Informally, we say debtors are responsible for their commitments, and creditors are beneficiaries of their commitments. In a detached commitment, the debtors are responsible for eventually making the consequent true. Responsibility can be several (each debtor is responsible for just its portion), joint (each debtor is individually responsible for the entire commitment), or joint and several (the creditors hold one debtor fully responsible, who then pursues other debtors). We use several responsibility so that, in serial composition of commitments, a debtor is never compelled to assume additional responsibilities. The result of serial composition is useful for reasoning about multiple commitments, but the original commitment expression, with its individual commitments, must be retained to determine which role(s) failed to perform if the resultant consequent is not produced.
C ⊕ states the union of debtors is committed to the union of creditors to bring about the consequent C A .csq ∧ C B .ant ∧ C B .csq when antecedent C A .ant is true. Debtors are severally responsible for C ⊕ , so that debtors are never compelled to assume additional responsibilities. Every debtor in C A .debt is partially responsible for discharging C A , and thus is partially responsible for discharging C ⊕ . Also, every debtor in C B .debt has some responsibility for C ⊕ . Eq. (1) captures this intuition for debtors. Eq. (2) captures the analogous intuition for creditors.
If we order the states of a commitment as null < can < rel < xfer < cond < detached < dis, then the state of a serial composition is the minimum of its constituents' states:
status).
That is, a serial composition progresses no further than its least constituent.
Because of Eqs. (3) and (4), serial composition is neither commutative nor associative. However, it creates commitments that are at least as strong as, and typically stronger than, their inputs. C A ⊕C B is typically stronger than C A because, even though both have the same antecedent (
. The lemma that follows shows serial composition is not always stronger, because ⊕ is idempotent: a commitment can be usefully added to a commitment chain only once.
(1)-(4) yield the same results for both sides.
Commitment Covering
Because commitments are crucial to our semantics of protocols, commitments are also crucial to refinement. And because we need to compare two protocols, we need a mechanism to compare two commitments. Specifically, each supercommitment must be covered by, or make at least the same commitment as, another relevant subcommitment. The commitment comparison accommodates a mapping to account for the commitments being expressed at different levels of abstraction. Definition 2.4 extends Chopra and Singh's [2009] notion of commitment strength. In addition to the logical relationships between antecedents and consequents, this definition incorporates the mapping of roles and propositions.
Definition 2.4 (Commitment Covering).
A stronger commitment C S covers (is stronger than) a weaker commitment C W with respect to mapping M, written C W ≤ M C S , if and only if
where
Every superdebtor is partially (severally) responsible for discharging the supercommitment. Each super-role is mapped to (implemented by) a set of subroles M(d). We require each superdebtor's responsibilities be passed to one or more of its subdebtors. Together these subdebtors assume the superdebtor's responsibilities. Eq. (5) captures the requirement that every superdebtor's responsibilities must pass to at least one of its subdebtors, so that responsibilities are not lost. Similarly, each supercreditor is a partial beneficiary of the supercommitment. Eq. (6) captures the requirement that every supercreditor's benefit passes to at least one of its subcreditors.
In many situations, multiple subcommitments must be combined to cover a single supercommitment. In these cases, a supercommitment is covered by the serial composition of multiple subcommitments.
We visualize our explanations by diagramming a commitment as a labeled arrow.
The name of the commitment is written in the top center of the arrow. Debtors and creditors are above the arrow and the antecedent and consequent below it. When multiple terms appear in a position, they are implicitly combined using the operator in parentheses. As a simple example, consider commitments C 1 = C Payer,Payee (promise, pay), C 2 = C Buyer,Seller (order, pay) , and an abstraction mapping M that is defined on roles and propositions as follows: (i) Payer → {Buyer}, (ii) Payee → {Seller}, (iii) promise → order, and (iv) pay → pay. The diagram shows C 2 covers C 1 .
As another example, we obtain C(order, ship) ≤ C(order ∨ freeCoupon, ship) by Eq. (7), since the stronger commitment detaches when order or freeCoupon is true. And, likewise C(order, ship) ≤ C(order, ship ∧ expressDelivery) holds by Eq. 8, since to discharge the stronger commitment requires expressDelivery in addition to ship.
RUNNING EXAMPLES OF PROTOCOLS

Protocol Descriptions
We introduce four running examples. Pay and PayViaMM are payment protocols whereas OrderPayShip and OrderPayViaMMShip are order protocols involving payments. Suggestive sequence diagrams are presented in the payee by sending the promise message. Later, it sends a payment message directly to the payee. Payer → Payee : promiseMsg means {promise, CREATE(C pay )};
8:
Payer → Payee : [promiseMsg] payMsg means {pay}; 9: } Listing 1 shows the Proton specification of protocol Pay. Lines 2-5 declare roles Payer and Payee, propositions promise and pay, and the commitment. Both promiseMsg and payMsg messages are sent by Payer to Payee. A message may be sent only if its guard (the expression between [ and ] ) is true. The guard for payMsg in line 8 is promiseMsg. If no guard is explicitly specified, as is the case for promiseMsg in line 7, it is implicitly true. A message's meaning is expressed as a set of actions after means and between { and }.
In protocol PayViaMM (pay via middleman), if the payer chooses to do so, it commits to paying the payee by sending the promise message. The middleman commits to sending payM if the payer sends payP by sending pledgeMsg. The payer then sends a payment indirectly to the payee, first paying the middleman, who in turn pays the payee. The sequence diagram in Figure 4 (b) shows a typical interaction. In this case, other acceptable runs also exist: for example, the middleman may send the payM message before the payP message. The Proton specification for PayViaMM is shown in Listing 2. Middleman commits to Payer to pass along any payment it receives (line 11). Payer will not pay Middleman without this commitment (line 12). Since payMMsg has an implicit guard of true (line 14), Middleman is allowed to pay early.
Protocol OrderPayShip in Figure 4 (c) supports a buyer placing an order with a seller. The buyer requests a price quote for a good from the seller. The seller sends the price quote along with its commitment to ship the good if the buyer orders. The buyer can accept the seller's offer by placing an order, which creates its commitment to pay for the good if it ships. The seller can ship first, or the buyer can pay first. Protocol C payP = C(Payer, Payee, promise, payP );
8: 
Mapping Abstractions across Protocols
Since superprotocols represent higher-level abstractions than subprotocols, comparing protocols must address differences in abstraction level. To this end, we map elements (roles, propositions, and commitments) of a putative superprotocol to elements of a putative subprotocol. We map every superelement to an expression of subelements, but a subprotocol may contain subelements that do not correspond with any superelement. 
Consider mapping M 1 in Listing 3 from Pay to PayViaMM . Each super-role is mapped to a set of subroles. Line 3 maps the Payer super-role in Pay to the Payer subrole in PayViaMM . Each superproposition in Pay is mapped to a Boolean expression of subpropositions in PayViaMM . Line 7 maps pay to the conjunction of payP and payM . Notice that payP and payM are messages sent by different roles in PayViaMM ; thus even the simple line 7 demonstrates the generality of our mapping approach. Line 9 maps supercommitment C pay to the serial composition of sub-commitments C payP and C payM .
There can be multiple mappings between some protocol pairs. The Middleman role does not appear in mapping M 1 . We can construct alternative mappings that group the Middleman into coalitions with different super-roles. We require each commitment to be explicitly mapped. A commitment mapping must not violate the role and proposition mappings, but that is not always sufficient to uniquely determine the commitment mapping. It is possible that a supercommitment can be mapped to multiple serial compositions that meet all constraints. In a hypothetical PayViaTwoMM protocol, where the payment can be made through either Middleman 1 or Middleman 2 , the supercommitment C 1 = C Payer,Payee (promise, pay) can be mapped to either of two serial compositions (the protocol designer chooses between them based on other factors). C pay → C payM ⊕ C payP ; //wrongorder 10: }
FORMALIZING PROTOCOLS AND THEIR REFINEMENT
We assume a set of atomic propositions that describe the state of the world and states of relevant commitments. We define actions as atomic propositions (being made true) and commitment operations (being performed). Messages set propositions true, but not false.
Definition 4.1. A protocol is a sextuple R, M, C, A, S, G corresponding, respectively, to: (i) a set R of roles; (ii) a set M of message names; (iii) a set C of commitments; (iv) a set A of Boolean propositions and commitment states; (v) a set S of states, S ⊆ 2 M such that ∅ ∈ S and if s ∈ S, gs ∈ G, and s ∈ gs.guard then s ∪ gs.msg ∈ S; and (vi) a set G of guarded statements of the form snd , rcv, guard , msg, actions with snd , rcv ∈ R, guard ⊆ S, msg ∈ M, and actions = {a i ∈ A} ∪ {Act C (C j ∈ C)} ∪ {nop}. In addition, we impose the no overlap constraint: ∀gs 1 , gs 2 ∈ G, if gs 1 .actions ∩ gs 2 .actions = ∅ then gs 1 .guard ∩ gs 2 .guard = ∅.
Each message corresponds to an atomic proposition recording whether the message has been sent. Each global state s ∈ S is a set of (the atomic propositions corresponding to) the messages that have been sent in that state (Item v). Each guarded statement gs ∈ G has a guard gs.guard which is a set of states, and a meaning gs.actexp: a conjunctive expression of actions. A message msg can be sent by the sender (gs.snd ) to the receiver (gs.rcv) in state s only if s ∈ gs.guard . When m is sent, the action expression gs.actexp becomes true in the next state. The actions corresponding to different messages may be interleaved. The no overlap constraint ensures that if two or more superactions contain the same subaction, and both superactions are enabled in a state, then the occurrence of the common subaction in a subrun is unambiguous as to which superaction it corresponds to, which recall is key to our notion of refinement.
Protocol Enactment
We introduce a run, a possible computation through our model, as a basis for our semantics. A run, notated π, is an alternating sequence of states and actions s 0 , a 1 , s 1 , a 2 , s 2 , . . . such that s i+1 results from performing a i+1 in s i . The length of π is written |π |.
We can now express two key intuitions. First, the semantics of a protocol is simply the set of runs it allows. Underlying each run is a coarser message enactment: a sequence of states and messages where each message's guard is true in the state where the message occurs. Second, a protocol refines another if and only if the runs of the first are also runs of the second, with the proviso that the putative subprotocol may involve roles and actions that are absent in the putative superprotocol. To capture the preceding, we need to relate protocols to models. Our approach generates a model from the putative subprotocol and then verifies (using suitable mapping) whether the putative superprotocol relates correctly with the subprotocol in that model, that is, whether the runs of the two protocols relate as explained before. Definition 4.2 specifies such a model.
Definition 4.2 (Proton Model). Let P = R, M, C, A, S, G be a protocol. Then, the Proton model for P is
and Act e = {sched = r|r ∈ R}, (vi) ∀i ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S :
G is the set of all states reachable from G 0 by transition function T in I, (ix) G 0 = ∅, and
Here × is binary cross-product and is set cross-product. The protocol's state is the cross-product of the state of each message and commitment. Since both messages and commitments involve multiple roles, each role has just a single state l and all state is in the environment (iv). Proton supports interleaved rather than concurrent actions with the environment scheduling one role at each step (v). Every role can perform the nop action (no-operation) at every step (v) . t m i is the transition function that tracks the past occurrence of message m i , and t C i is the transition function that tracks the commitment state of commitment C i as defined by Figure 3 (vii) .
Through a slight abuse of notation, for simplicity, we treat guards and actions as expressions in the following. 
actexp).
A message enactment yields one or more runs with different interleavings of each message's actions. We define a function μ that maps each index in the message enactment to the index in the run where the corresponding message expression m j .actexp becomes true. Each message expression occurs in the same order in every run, and becomes true precisely at the state where its execution completes. 
Definition 4.4 (Run). Let P = R, M, C, A, S, G be a protocol and
actexp).
We say a run is well-defined to emphasize that it satisfies the guard and action expression conditions given before, that it is more than just an alternating sequence of states and actions. The empty run ∅ is always well-defined, since no agent is required to perform any action. 
We write runs(P) for the set of all runs generated by protocol P in I P .
Protocol Refinement
Definition 4.6 (Mapping). M maps protocol
Informally, a run π Q embeds a run π P if all of π P lies within π Q . In effect, π Q does everything that π P does, and possibly more: as Mallya and Singh [2007] propose, a protocol Q refines a protocol P if and only if every run of Q embeds some run of P. This captures the intuition that any computation (run) allowed by Q is allowed by P as well.
Consider the mapping from Pay to OrderPayShip. 
status).
Continuing with the previous discussion, we map each subrun and verify that it embeds some super-run. The following definition captures the intuition that the embedding subrun steps through each of the states of the embedded super-run, but may potentially include additional states. We ignore the transitions in each run.
To simplify the notation, we also introduce a projected mapping function M(q) = M(q) ∩ A P that is the set of just the propositions and states in a (super-)protocol P. Definition 4.8 (Embedding). Let P and Q be two protocols. A run π Q = q 0 , ·, q 1 , . . . ∈ runs(Q) embeds a run π P = p 0 , ·, p 1 , . . . ∈ runs(P), written emb(π Q , π P ), if and only if there exists a strictly increasing function on natural num-
Function τ maps from indices of π P to indices of π Q , and the conditions ensure every time M(q j ) changes, the new value matches the next p i . Now we can define refinement in purely semantic terms that capture our intuition that each mapped subrun must embed some super-run. Notice that this definition implicitly uses Proton models I P and I Q , respectively, for P and Q. Definition 4.9 (Refinement). Let P and Q be two protocols, and M a mapping from P to Q. Then Q refines P under M if and only if (∀π Q ∈ runs(Q) : (∃π P ∈ runs(P) : emb(M(π Q ), π P ))). Figure 5 shows the high-level process flow for verifying protocol refinement. The Proton preprocessor reads the subprotocol, superprotocol, and mapping specifications and constructs (as Section 6 details) the input for the MCMAS model checker in the Interpreted Systems Programming Language (ISPL) ]. The input to MCMAS is a set of guarded statements for each role. Internally, MCMAS implicitly generates a state transition system such as that shown in Figure 6 . The system starts in initial state s 0 . Action requestQuote transitions to state s 1 , action sendQuote transitions to state s 2 , and so on. There is an edge for every action enabled in a state.
VERIFYING PROTOCOL REFINEMENT
The Proton preprocessor generates an interpreted system model for the subprotocol. There is one ISPL agent definition for each subrole, and the state of all subelements (propositions and commitments) are expressed as model state variables. The model checker simulates the subprotocol's actions. Because each superelement is mapped to an expression of subelements, the state of every superelement can be inferred from the subprotocol's state. As Section 5.6 shows, protocol refinement conditions are expressed as CTL formulae. If all these CTL formulae are true, the subprotocol refines the superprotocol.
Intuition: Decomposition
A message can mean multiple things. To better understand and characterize a message, we decompose each message into its meaning as a set of primitive, well-defined actions. The meaning of a message is then the conjunction of all its constituent actions.
An action is either a Boolean proposition or a commitment operation. A propositional action sets the value of the proposition to true. We do not support setting propositions to false. Commitment actions are the operations CREATE, TRANSFER, RELEASE, and CANCEL that change the state of a commitment.
We replace all message terms with a conjunction of their actions throughout a protocol, decomposing protocol messages, converting from a "protocol of guarded messages" to a "protocol of guarded actions." Each msg term is replaced by a conjunction of its actions in both the guard and the action expression of every guarded statement. 
means([guard
Intuition: Diffusion
The result of decomposition is a set of guarded action expressions, but the model checker executes actions, not action expressions. Therefore, each guarded action expression must be converted to an equivalent set of guarded actions. However, computing the equivalent guarded actions is nontrivial. For example, consider the guarded action expression
A naïve approach would be to apply the guard to each action separately: [guard ] payP and [guard ] payM . Doing so would be overly restrictive because neither payP nor payM can occur before the guard becomes true. Greater flexibility is needed.
Given a guarded conjunction of actions [guard] a 1 ∧ a 2 ∧ · · · ∧ a n , the action expression becomes true when the last (in time) of the a i s becomes true. Given a guarded disjunction of actions [guard] a 1 ∨ a 2 ∨ · · · ∨ a n , the action expression becomes true when the first (in time) of the a i s becomes true. We minimally constrain when the a i become true so the overall expression becomes true at exactly the same point, relative to the other actions, in both the superruns and the subruns. For conjunctions, all the a i , except the last, can move to any earlier point in time. For disjunctions, all the a i , except the first, can move to any later point in time. The a i can even move all the way to the run's beginning (conjunction) or end (disjunction). Decomposition (Section 5.1) generates guarded action expressions with conjunctions; abstraction mappings (Section 5.4) can generate guarded action expressions with both conjunctions and disjunctions.
The recursive diffusion function dif transforms a guarded action expression to a set of guarded actions. We have
where guard and exp i are Boolean expressions of actions. Diffusion transforms the guarded expression example given before, to the following.
Both actions can still occur after the guard becomes true, so it allows at least all of the runs allowed in the naïve approach. Additionally, the first action to fire can fire at any time. If payP fires before payM , then ¬payM is true when payP fires, so payP can fire at any time. Diffusion thus covers possibilities that the naïve approach omits.
Intuition: Collection
Diffusion can generate multiple guarded statements for the same action, but MCMAS requires a single guarded statement for each action. Therefore, we introduce the collection function col that converts a set of guarded statements back to canonical form, where there is a single guarded statement for each action. Consider each individual, input action. Here, col collects potentially multiple guarded statements for that action in its input, and generates a single guarded statement for that action in its output. The output guard for the action is the conjunction of all the input guards. If an action appears in only one guarded statement in the input, that guarded statement appears unmodified in the output.
Consider a partial protocol containing these two guarded statements. Since the messages overlap on action ship, condition freeCoupon ensures the no overlap constraint of Definition 4.1.
[orderMsg ∧ ¬freeCoupon] paidShipMsg means {bill , ship}; [orderMsg ∧ freeCoupon] freeShipMsg means {ship}; Diffusion transforms those to the following three guarded statements.
Collection merges the two statements for ship, giving these two, final guarded statements. Figure 7 (a) schematically shows how the foregoing developments of decomposition, diffusion, collection, and embedding combine together to check whether one protocol refines another. However, by themselves, they do not address the fact that different protocols can be written at different layers of abstraction.
Accommodating Abstraction Mapping
Since superprotocols represent higher-level abstractions than subprotocols, comparing protocols must address differences in levels of abstraction. There is often no one-toone correspondence between superelements and subelements. Protocol elements (roles, propositions, and commitments) must be mapped between the two protocols to compare them.
An important type of abstraction difference is the introduction of intermediaries or middlemen in lower-level abstractions. Whereas two super-roles may communicate directly with each other using a single message in a high-level protocol, there is a natural tendency for message communication to pass through multiple, intermediary subroles as that protocol is refined to lower-level abstractions. Protocol refinement must allow superelements to span intermediaries. One superproposition could map to an expression of multiple subpropositions, each controlled by different subroles (intermediaries), and one supercommitment could be fulfilled through multiple subcommitments and their intermediate subdebtors.
We say one protocol refines another protocol under a given mapping, because mapping functions are an essential element for protocol refinement, and must be an explicit input. A subprotocol might refine a superprotocol under one mapping, but not under a different mapping. Our approach does not determine whether it is impossible for one protocol to refine another protocol under any possible mapping.
A mapping expresses how terms in a putative superprotocol map to expressions in a putative subprotocol. The mapping function map converts guarded action expressions written with high-level abstractions x i in a putative superprotocol, to expressions e i of low-level terms in a putative subprotocol. (Next x i → e i is a mapping assertion.)
Verifying Refinement: Summary
Figure 7(b) schematically shows the transformations and comparison required to demonstrate protocol refinement. In both subfigures, horizontal lines show the transformations of a single protocol: decomposition (means), mapping (map), diffusion (dif), and collection (col). Vertical lines show the comparison between two protocols: run embedding (emb). The nodes in the figure show how guarded messages (gMsg) are transformed first to guarded action expressions (gExp), and then to guarded actions (gAct). In each subfigure, the top row refers to a superprotocol and the bottom row refers to a subprotocol.
Generating CTL Formulae for Verification
MCMAS checks whether an interpreted system model satisfies specified CTL formulae. In this section, we describe how Proton expresses conditions for commitment resolution, overlapping messages, serial composition, and commitment covering as CTL formulae. All such formulae must be satisfied for protocol refinement to hold. 5.6.1. Verify Run Embedding by Checking Guards. Protocol comparison is fundamentally based on run embedding. Run embedding means, at every state, if the subprotocol can perform an action then the superprotocol must also be able to perform that action. That is, when an action's subguard is true, its superguard must also be true. Since run embedding ignores actions not in the superprotocol, Proton generates CTL formulae for all actions that result from mapping all superactions (∀a ∈ M(A super )).
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5.6.2. Verify that Messages Do Not Overlap. So that every action a in a subrun can be uniquely associated with a message, we verify the no overlap constraint of Definition 4.1. For every pair of guarded statements gs 1 and gs 2 that share a common action meaning a, AG(¬(gs 1 .guard ∧ gs 2 .guard )).
5.6.3. Verify that Detached Commitments Eventually Resolve. We require each detached commitment must eventually resolve in every correct protocol enactment. We employ model checker fairness constraints (expressions that must be true infinitely often on any run) to eliminate subruns in which the subroles fail to act properly and resolve their detached commitments. Doing so restricts our verification to correct enactments of the given protocols, thus avoiding false negatives due to incorrect enactments.
The states of supercommitments can be inferred from the states of subcommitments.
5.6.4. Verify Commitment Covering. The truth or falsity of a statement in an unreachable state has no bearing on the enactment of a protocol, so we can replace a |= b statements by the CTL formula AG(a → b). Doing so enables us to use the model checker to verify commitment covering, which would otherwise need to be handled separately, as indeed it was in a previous version of Proton.
Verifying one commitment covers another under map M, C W ≤ M C S , is done in two parts. First, the preprocessor verifies the debtor and creditor conditions (Eqs. (5) and (6)). Second, the model checker verifies the antecedent and consequent conditions (Eqs. (7) and (8)) hold in all (reachable) states with the CTL formulae.
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5.6.5. Verify Serial Compositions are Well-Defined. For serial compositions C ⊕ = C A ⊕ C B , the model checker verifies the well-definedness condition holds in all (reachable) states on all paths with the CTL formula
TOOLING, DETAILED EXAMPLES, AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we pull together the many elements: commitments, serial composition of commitments, and commitment covering; the example payment and order protocols, and various mappings between them; and the formal definitions. We concretely demonstrate how PayViaMM refines, or fails to refine, Pay under various mappings.
Proton verifies protocol refinement using the process flow as shown in Figure 5 and the pseudocode for refines(super, map, sub) shown in Listing 7. The inputs P and Q are protocols, which in our syntax are in terms of guarded messages. The first lines of the algorithm transform these into protocols expressed in terms of guarded actions. Proton generates an interpreted system model from the guarded actions of the subprotocol. There is one MCMAS agent definition for each subrole, and the state of the subelements (propositions and commitments) are MCMAS state variables. The MCMAS model checker then simulates the subprotocol's actions. Because each superelement is mapped to an expression of sub-elements, the superprotocol's state can be inferred from the subprotocol's state. Refinement requires the model of the subprotocol to satisfy a set of CTL formulae. If all formulae are true, the subprotocol refines the superprotocol.
We now check whether PayViaMM refines Pay under map M 1 . Using the commitment diagrams from Section 2.6, this diagram demonstrates commitment C pay from Pay is Listing 7 Calculate refines(P, M, Q)
Input Q is a protocol of guarded messages 2: P gMsg = P Input P is a protocol of guarded messages 3: Q gAct = col(dif(means(Q gMsg ))) protocol of guarded sub-actions 4: P gAct = col(dif(map M (means(P gMsg )) (13), which verifies whether subguards imply superguards, for actions promise, pay P , pay M , CREATE(C payP ), and CREATE(C payM ) generates Eqs. (19)- (23), respectively. Eq. (24) verifies that C payP ⊕C payM is well defined. Eqs. (7) and (8), which verify the antecedent and consequent conditions of C payP ⊕ C payM covers C pay , generate Eqs. (25) and (26), respectively (the debtor and creditor conditions in Eqs. (5) and (6) are checked directly by the Proton preprocessor, not by MCMAS). 
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Proton correctly reports failures. Proton generates these CTL formulae when checking whether PayViaMM refines Pay under mapping B 1 in Listing 6. Recall that B 1 maps the supercommitment to a serial composition in the wrong order. Eqs. (19)- (23) are also generated, and all hold in the model. Eq. (29) obviously holds. But Eq. (27) does not hold because pay M has a true guard in Listing 2, so the Middleman can send pay M at any time, even before promise. Eq. (28) comes from the antecedent of C pay (which is promise) and the antecedent of C payM ⊕ C payP (which is pay P ). In the states between the Payer promising and the Payer actually paying, the formula does not hold, meaning that C pay can become detached without C payM ⊕ C payP also becoming detached. The result is C pay is not covered by C payM ⊕ C payP . MCMAS correctly reports these two formulae as false in the model, and PayViaMM does not refine Pay under mapping B 1 .
As in Mallya and Singh's [2007] approach, an interesting consequence of our treatment of refinement is that aggregation functions like refinement. For example, consider a protocol OrderPayShip. Because all enactments of OrderPayShip necessarily include an enactment of Pay, OrderPayShip is naturally a refinement of Pay. The foregoing coheres with the notion of subtype in object-oriented programming.
Proton verified all the refinements shown in Figure 1 and Table I . The first three columns are the superprotocol, subprotocol, and mapping, respectively. OrderPayShip is identical to the first NetBill scenario described by Mallya and Singh [2007] . NetBill 2 and NetBill 3 are scenarios 2 and 3 in the same paper. PayBySpouse is a new, simple payment protocol where one person promises and then his or her spouse pays. FullPay is similar to Pay, but exercises all the commitment operations: CREATE, TRANSFER, RELEASE, and CANCEL.
Each superprotocol-subprotocol pair has a unique set of mapping names, so M 1 for Pay and PayViaMM is a different mapping than M 1 for Pay and PayViaCheck . Mappings M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , and B 1 for Pay and PayViaMM are shown, respectively, in Listings 3, 4, 5, and 6. Column refines is Yes if subprotocol refines superprotocol under map; column ⊕ is the number of serial compositions in the mapping; column covers is the number of commitment covering checks; column formulae is the number of CTL formulae verified emb(M(π Q ), π P ) implies (∀a i ∈ A P : I, g 0 |= AG(a i .sub − guard → a i .super − guard )), which implies the CTL formulae at line 7 are true.
Because all detached commitments must eventually resolve, the fairness formulae at line 10 are true. Because all commitment coverings must be valid, the formulae at lines 14-15 are true. Because all serial compositions must be valid, the formulae at line 18 are true. Because protocols must be well-defined, the formulae at line 21 are true. Because all of the CTL formulae evaluate to true, refines(P,M,Q) returns true.
DISCUSSION
Commitments support finer guard granularity than propositions can. A proposition divides time into two stages: before and after it holds. A commitment divides time into four stages: null, active and conditional, active and detached, and resolved.
Rather than waiting for final resolution, a protocol can make progress sooner if an action's guard is enabled after one of the first three stages. Commitments increase protocol flexibility, because guards can specify earlier stages. For example, suppose the Buyer role in OrderPayShip decides whether to pay based on the state of proposition ship. Since ship has only two stages, the role's decision can only be "all" (ship complete) or "nothing" (ship not complete). The "all" choice is represented by the guarded statement [ship] pay, and the "nothing" choice is represented by [true] pay. Using commitments, the protocol can guard pay based on any of the four commitment stages. A guard can enable pay as soon as the debtor commits to make ship true.
[CREATE(C Seller,Buyer (pay, ship))] pay Incorporating commitments can improve flexibility over traditional protocol frameworks.
A necessary prerequisite of employing protocols is that the participants of a service engagement agree on the format and meanings of the messages they exchange. Note that such agreement is unavoidable: it is just that in today's practice the meanings are not expressed clearly and explicitly and any agreements are hardcoded in implementations.
Our definition of protocol refinement does not mean agents that can participate in a superprotocol can necessarily participate unchanged in a subprotocol. In our model, agents may need to be modified to participate in subprotocols. For example, an agent capable of participating in a basic payment protocol needs to handle the additional messages required in paying via check or credit card.
Relevant Literature
Proton is the first approach for protocol refinement that incorporates mapping superelements to expressions of subelements. Proton supports mapping super-roles to sets of subroles, superpropositions to Boolean expressions of subpropositions, and supercommitments to serial compositions of chains of subcommitments. Mallya and Singh [2007] propose a definition of protocol refinement (which they call subsumption) that compares the order of state pairs in state runs. For every pair of states in the superprotocol run, there must be some matching pair of states in the subprotocol run with the same order. However, this definition can create false positives when multiple state pairs in the super-run each match the same state pair in the subrun or when one superstate matches different substates. For example, all state pairs in the super-run 1, 2, 3 have matching state pairs in the subrun 2, 1, 3, 2 even though the two runs are very different. Our definition compares runs step-by-step and thereby avoids the aforesaid problems, even if protocol looping is allowed.
Our definition of commitment covering is an extension of commitment strength as defined by Chopra and Singh [2009] , who identify the basic requirements in Eqs. (7) and (8). We extend Chopra and Singh's [2009] definition with the role requirements in Eqs. (5) and (6), and we allow commitments to be at different levels of abstraction by including an abstraction mapping function. Singh [2008] states rules for commitment chaining similar to those proposed here, but does not directly state a rule for stronger consequents, and does not directly state a rule similar to serial composition. The concrete commitment created by serial composition provides a midpoint in commitment reasoning, and can potentially make the comparison of commitments across protocols more explicit.
When we say a group of debtors are jointly and severally responsible for eventually making the consequent true, we mean this in the sense of Rescher's [1998] legal responsibility where "individual agents are responsible only for their own individual acts." We do not mean Rescher's [1998] notion of legal responsibility where the group as a whole becomes a legal person, nor his notion of moral responsibility where intentions are crucial (intentions are absent from our formulation). In Norman and Reed [2002] , group imperatives can be addressed distributively (as a list of individuals) or as a collective. In both cases, group imperatives imply more than just a collection of individual imperatives. While joint and several responsibility is similar to distributive responsibility, because only one member of the group is required to act, it is different, because joint and several responsibility is only a summary of individual responsibilities and does not impose additional responsibilities on roles that are members of a group.
Our work on protocols builds on the fundamental intuition that protocol states can be effectively characterized in terms of the commitments of the participants, and that such characterization can be used as a basis for correct enactments and for further reasoning. The earliest works that developed the preceding theme include the commitment machines approach of Yolum and Singh [2002] for business protocols and McBurney and Parsons ' [2002] framework for sequencing multiple dialog games, allowing one dialog game to be embedded inside another partially completed dialog game.
We do not propose specific, desirable properties of protocols, but others have. Yolum [2007] , Singh and Chopra [2010] , and El-Menshawy et al. [2010] describe desirable properties of protocols in general and commitment protocols in particular, including fairness, safety, liveness, operability, and transparency.
We use Boolean guards to constrain actions, but other representations are possible. Baldoni et al. [2010] proposed constraints based on regulative specifications. Regulative specifications constrain the execution flow using special-purpose operators on state values. Gabbay [1987] proposes using past-temporal expressions for controlling when actions can occur and future-temporal expressions for controlling which actions must occur in the future. Past-temporal expressions are more expressive than our guard expressions.
Directions for Future Research
Constructing a mapping function from a superprotocol to a subprotocol can be a challenging task. Advice to guide protocol designers, in the form of a basic mapping methodology, would be a valuable addition to this work. Winikoff [2006 Winikoff [ , 2007 proposed a methodology for the related task of designing commitment-based protocols. Some of these ideas could be valuably adapted into a future commitment mapping methodology. The approach begins with an easily understood, but not exhaustive, set of sequence diagrams, and then specifies specific steps to generalize the protocol and expand its set of runs.
Our model and formulation of refinement respects intuitions similar to those of Mallya and Singh [2007] . Mallya and Singh describe protocol composition and establish results relating composition and refinement. We expect that similar results would apply in our framework, and plan to formalize and reason about composition in future work.
Model checkers have been extended to handle epistemic and strategic modal operators [Alur et al. 2002; Fagin et al. 1995] . We have begun investigating the inclusion of such concepts into our definitions. Building on top of a model checker that already handles these concepts, such as MCMAS, will simplify our future extensions. Another important enhancement would be to expand the class of protocols to those that support iteration.
